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Wolin: Mullaney v. Wilbur

MULLANEY v. WILBUR
CRIMINAL LAW-Affirmative defenses-Burden of proof-In prosecution for murder, the state must prove the absence of heat of
passion. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
It is an ancient maxim of our criminal law that a defendant
never bears the burden of persuading the judge or jury of his
innocence.' The prosecution, therefore, must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every essential element of a crime charged.2 Application of a statute which appears to conflict with these principles
raises a due process question. The United States Supreme Court
confronted one such question in Mullaney v. Wilbur.3 The case
involved the operation of two Maine statutes4 which the courts
construed as requiring defendants charged with murder, in order
to reduce the homicide to manslaughter, to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the killing occurred in the heat of passion .5 The issue presented was whether the statutes comported
with due process of law. The Court held that they did not.
Factually, the case was quite simple.' In 1966, Stillman E.
1. The burden of persuasion must be distinguished from the burden of going forward,
which is a separate component of the burden of proof. The burden of going forward is the
responsibility of introducing evidence sufficient to raise a prima facie case. Failure to do
so can subject the party to a directed verdict.
The burden of persuasion enters the proceeding only after the burden of going forward
has been met. The party who bears the burden of persuasion also bears the risk of nonpersuasion; failure to satisfy the burden means that the issue is decided against that party.
For a further discussion of burdens of proof see W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW
§ 8, at 44-51 (1972); C. MCcORMIcK, EVIDENCE §§ 336-37 (2d ed: 1972).
2. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). See text accompanying notes 24-26 infra.
3. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
4. Whoever unlawfully kills a human being with malice aforethought, either
express or implied, is guilty of murder and shall be punished by imprisonment
for life.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2651 (1964).
Whoeverunlawfully kills a human being in the heat of passion, on sudden
provocation, without express or implied malice aforethought. . . shall be punished by a fine of not more than $1,000 or by imprisonment for not more than
20 years ....
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2551 (1964).
5. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 685 (1975); see State v. Lafferty, 309 A.2d 647,
661-74 (Me. 1973); State v. Wilbur, 278 A.2d 139, 143-46 (Me. 1971).
6. It had, however, a long and complicated history in the lower courts. After his
conviction was affirmed, State v. Wilbur, 278 A.2d 139 (Me. 1971), the defendant petitioned for habeas corpus relief in the federal district court. The district court held that
malice aforethought is an essential element of murder and therefore vacated the conviction under the rule of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). Wilbur v. Robbins, 349 F. Supp.
149 (D. Me. 1972). The court of appeals affirmed. Wilbur v. Mullaney, 473 F.2d 943 (1st
Cir. 1973).
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Wilbur, Jr., was tried for murder. He offered no evidence, but his
attorney argued that the homicide was manslaughter based on
the fact that Wilbur had apparently killed one Claude Hebert
while in a frenzied state precipitated by the deceased's homosexual advances. After opposing arguments, the court charged the
jury that malice aforethought was to be implied "unless the defendant proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he
acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation." '7 Thus, once
the jury found that the killing was both intentional and unlawful,
the burden of persuasion fell on the defendant to prove the mitigating circumstances.'
After his conviction of murder,' Wilbur appealed on the
ground that it was a violation of due process for the state to
require a defendant to negate the essential element of malice
aforethought. The state contended that murder and manslaughter are in essence punishment categories within the single offense
of felonious homicide. Thus, the same proof would be required for
While the state's petition for certiorari was pending before the Supreme Court, Maine
decided State v. Lafferty, 309 A.2d 647 (Me. 1973), which clarified Maine's interpretation
of its murder and manslaughter statutes. See text accompanying notes 9-10 infra. The
Supreme Court granted the state's petition and remanded to the court of appeals for
reconsideration in light of Lafferty. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974). On remand,
the First Circuit again held Maine's statutory scheme violative of due process. This time,
however, the court accepted Maine's interpretation that malice aforethought is not an
essential element, of murder. Wilbur v. Mullaney, 496 F.2d 1303 (1st Cir. 1974).
7. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 686 (1975): The concept of malice aforethought
is difficult to define because it has been taken to comprehend a considerable number of
different conditions of mind. Some jurisdictions have held that malice denotes a wicked
and corrupt disregard for the lives and safety of others. See, e.g., Turner v. Commonwealth, 167 Ky. 365, 180 S.W. 768, 772 (1915) ("a general malignant recklessness of the
lives and safety of others"); Commonwealth v. Malone, 354 Pa. 180, 47 A.2d 445, 449
(1946) ("an uncalled-for act in callous disregard of its likely harmful effects on others").
'Other jurisdictions give primary importance to hatred, malevolence, or ill will. See, e.g.,
Fears v. State, 33 Ariz. 432, 265 P. 600, 601 (1928) ("it is necessary . . . to show that the
accused was actuated by spite, ill will, or an evil motive"). Still other jurisdictions have
interpreted malice more inclusively. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 323 S.W.2d 811,813 (Mo.
1959) (" 'the intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse' "); Nunez
v. State, 383 P.2d 726, 729 (Wyo. 1963) ("intentional killing of a human being by another,
without legal justification or excuse"). Because of the ambiguous nature of the term, many
jurisdictions have abandoned it. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 1975).
8. The essence of the charge was that:
In all cases where the unlawful killing is proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and
where there is nothing in the circumstances of the case to explain, qualify or
palliate the action, the law presumes it to have been done with malice aforethought. And if the accused, that is the defendant, would reduce the crime below
the degree of murder, the burden is upon him to rebut the inference which the
law raises from the act of killing, by evidence in defense.
Wilbur v. Mullaney, 473 F.2d 943, 944 (1st Cir. 1973).
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both murder and manslaughter. Absent a finding of mitigation,
Maine's public policy demanded punishment of all felonious
homicides as murder? In other words, Maine contended that the
burden devolved upon the defendant only after the jury decided
that he had committed an intentional and unlawful homicide.'"
Consequently, Maine argued that the statutes as construed could
not be considered to force the defendant to disprove an essential
element of the crime.
In affirming the First Circuit's finding of a constitutional
violation,II the Supreme Court set forth a pure'due process analy2
sis. Electing to follow Maine's interpretation of its own statutes,'
the Court nevertheless disregarded the form and examined the
substance of them. Piercing the labels given by the respective
parties, the Court reached its decision by weighing the competing
interests involved. 3 It decided that the interests of the defendant
were paramount. The Court found it unimportant whether the
issue was phrased as one of guilt or innocence or as merely one of
degree of culpability and gave primary emphasis to the significant difference in the consequences for the defendant." Indeed,
9. The public policy is to demand the harsher penalty unless the defendant proves
otherwise. State v. Rollins, 295 A.2d 914, 920 (Me. 1972); State v. Wilbur, 278 A.2d 139,
145-46 (Me. 1971).
10. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 688-92, 696-98 (1975); State v. Lafferty,
309 A.2d 647, 662-65 (Me. 1973); State v. Rollins, 295 A.2d 914, 918-21 (Me. 1972); State
v. Wilbur, 278 A.2d 139, 144-46 (Me. 1971).
11. Wilbur v. Mullaney, 496 F.2d 1303 (1st Cir. 1974). This was the second time that
the First Circuit considered the case. See note 6 supra.
12. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 690-91 (1975). The Court could have reached
the same result by accepting the defendant's argument that malice aforethought was an
essential element of the crime of murder in Maine. The state would then have been
required to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. Acceptance by the Court of the defendant's interpretation of Maine law, however, would have raised important questions of
federalism. In particular, such a determination would have clouded the states' prerogative
to define the elements of the crimes in their criminal codes. For further discussion of the
federalism issue confronting the Court see Comment, Due Process and Supremacy As
Foundations For the Adequacy Rule: The Remains of Federalism After Wilbur v.
Mullaney, 26 MAINE L. Rav. 37 (1974).
The Supreme Court chose to accept Maine's statutory interpretation, noting that
except in extreme circumstances, state courts are the "ultimate expositors of state law."
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975); see Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507
(1948); Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. 590 (1875). Ironically, by refusing to open the
Pandora's box of federal court construction of state criminal statutes, Mullaney opened
the courts to a surfeit of challenges to affirmative defenses based on its extension of the
prosecutor's burden of persuasion beyond the essential elements of the crime. The potential ramifications of Mullaney may not have been as great had the Court ruled that malice
aforethought was an essential element of murder.
13. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 697-702 (1975).
14. Id. at 698.
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in light of the different penalties attached to verdicts of murder
and of manslaughter, Justice Powell, in his opinion for the Court,
wondered whether "the distinction established by Maine between
murder and manslaughter may be of greater importance than the
difference between guilt or innocence for many lesser crimes."' 5
The defendant's interest in avoiding the stigma attached to a
verdict of murder, as 6opposed to a verdict of manslaughter, was
another factor noted.

The final important interest noted by the Court was the societal interest in the integrity of the criminal process. The Court
reaffirmed the principle that "use of the reasonable doubt standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of
the community in applications of the criminal law.

' 17

The Court

believed that any dilution of this standard of proof would lead to
the fear that innocent people might be condemned. In view of the
wide discrepancy between the punishments for murder and manslaughter, the Court held that the due process clause requires
that the prosecution not be relieved of its burden of proving the
absence of heat of passion beyond a reasonable doubt once the
issue is properly raised. Any other practice might result in a defendant being "given a life sentence when the evidence indicates
that it is as likely as not that he deserves a significantly lesser
sentence.""
In examining the countervailing interests, the Mullaney
Court considered the burden on the state of proving a fact which
is peculiarly within the defendant's knowledge. While recognizing
a disparity in the opportunity for knowledge relating to the presence of heat of passion, the Court deemed this a part of the
traditional burden on the prosecution. 9
The Court also briefly disposed of the state's argument that
it would be burdened with proof of a negative averment. One
court has found that requiring the prosecution to prove the absence of heat of passion beyond a reasonable doubt "seems tanta15. Id.

16. Id. See also Comment, supra note 12, at 84-85.
17. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 700 (1975), quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 364 (1970).
18. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 703 (1975) (emphasis in original). In Maine, a
conviction of manslaughter carries a penalty ranging from a fine to a prison sentence of
not more than 20 years; murder carries a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. See
note 4 supra.
19. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 702 (1975).
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mount to increasing the labors of Hercules.

' 20

Justice Powell,

however, simply noted that the requirement is not unique and
found that it worked no special undue hardship in the instant
case 21
A decision affirming Wilbur's conviction either on the ground
that no essential element of the crime was involved, or that the
state need not bear the burden of proving the presence of aggravating or the absence of mitigating factors, would have been an
open invitation for states to engage in judicial or legislative characterization. 22 The states could then have legitimately altered the
traditional reasonable doubt standard by redefining "the elements that constitute different crimes, characterizing them as
factors that bear solely on the extent of punishment." Such
action would subvert the reasonable doubt standard.
The Supreme Court, in ultimately ignoring the state's label,
relied on a solid background of its prior decisions.
Foremost
2
24
among these was In re Winship, which held:

[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.
In Mullaney, the Court extended this principle to include
facts bearing solely on the degree of culpability. The rationale set
forth was essentially that of the Winship decision, in which the
Court had summarized in similar terms the reasons for generally
allocating the
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to the
26
prosecution:

20. People v. Balogun, 372 N.Y.S.2d 384, 387 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1975) (reluctantly following Mullaney, however, in finding a due process violation in a New York

homicide statute similar to Maine's). See notes 40-41 infra and accompanying text.
21. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 701 (1975).
22. Id. at 697-99. See generally Comment, The Constitutionalityof the Common Law
Presumptionof Malice in Maine, 54 B.U.L. REV. 973, 1000 (1974).
23. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698 (1975). The Court vividly illustrated this
possibility. Many state statutes define different degrees of assault, each with a different
punishment range. Had the Mullaney Court found it dispositive that malice aforethought
was not an essential element of murder, the states would have been able to punish a
defendant with the most severe penalty solely by construing elements of aggravation as
affirmative defenses to assault.
24. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). The holding, which focused on the area of juvenile rights,
was subsequently held to have retroactive application. Ivan v. New York, 407 U.S. 203
(1972).
25. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
26. Id. at 363.
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The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt has [a]
vital role in our criminal procedure for cogent reasons. The accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake interests of
immense importance, both because of the possibility that he
may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction.
The Winship Court relied heavily on principles established in In
re Gault,2" an earlier case involving juvenile rights. Arizona law
did not label an adjudication of delinquency a criminal proceeding. The Supreme Court held that the state's characterization of

this proceeding was not controlling; the classification of juvenile
proceedings as civil could not be determinative of the due process
questions raised.28
Speiser v. Randall" is another case which helped to form the
analysis developed in Mullaney. In Speiser, the Court recognized
the interests which a defendant shares with society:"
There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error
in factfinding, which both parties must take into account.
Where one party has at stake an interest of transcending
value-as a criminal defendant his liberty-this margin of error
is reduced as to him by the process of placing on the other party
the burden of. . . persuading the factfinder at the conclusion
of the trial of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Due process
commands that no man shall lose his liberty unless the Government has borne the burden of. . . convincing the factfinder of
his guilt.
The interests at stake for Stillman Wilbur, Jr., demanded application of a similar standard.
The Supreme Court's decision in Mullaney should be compared with dictum by the Court in Morrison v. California."'Justice Cardozo reasoned in that case that:3 2
27. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
28. Id. at 30-31.
29. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
30. Id. at 525-26.
31. 291 U.S. 82 (1934). The case presented a challenge to the Alien Land Law of
California which forbade an alien who was neither a citizen nor eligible for naturalization
to occupy land for agricultural purposes unless permitted to do so by treaty. The statute
placed the burden of proving citizenship or eligibility upon the defendant. The Court

found this burden intolerable. The promotion of convenience to the prosecution was outweighed by the probability of injustice to the accused.
32. Id. at 88-89.
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[Wlithin limits of reason and fairness the burden of proof may
be lifted from the state in criminal prosecutions and cast on a
defendant. The limits are in substance these, that the state shall
have proved enough to make it just for the defendant to be
required to repel what has been proved with excuse or explanation, or at least that upon a balancing of convenience or of the
opportunities for knowledge the shifting of the burden will be
found to be an aid to the accuser without subjecting the accused
to hardship or oppression.
This statement was borne out in later cases which held that states
may "creat[e] an affirmative defense in justification of the crime
wholly independent of the essential facts constituting the crime
. .. .,,The continued viability of affirmative defenses will now

depend upon the breadth given to the Mullaney principle. Since
the holding in Mullaney itself was limited to the constitutionality
of a single statute, the courts will have to examine other affirmative defenses on a case-by-case basis.
The situation in New York is illustrative. Section 25.00 of
New York's Penal Law provides:3 4
1. When a "defense," other than an "affirmative defense" defined by statute is raised at a trial, the people have the burden
of disproving such defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
2. When a defense declared by statute to be an "affirmative
defense" is raised at a trial, the defendant has the burden of
establishing such defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
This statute, enacted in 1967, represented a sharp departure from
New York's common law concept of the burden of proof in criminal cases. 5 Traditionally, the defendant who asserted an affirmative defense bore only the burden of going forward with sufficient
evidence to put the defense in issue. The burden then fell on the
People to disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt. People v.
Downs 6 is a case on point. In Downs, the New York Court of
33. United States ex rel. Crosby v. Delaware, 346 F. Supp. 213, 216 (D. Del. 1972).
See, e.g., Comment, supra note 22, at 979-80; Comment, Affirmative Defenses UnderNew
York's New Penal Law, 19 SYa. L. REV. 44 (1967).
34. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 25.00 (McKinney 1975).
35. Although the former Penal Law did not treat this subject, the Court of
Appeals repeatedly held that, when any of the recognized "defenses" . . . was
raised by the defendant, the burden with respect thereto immediately shifted
to the People, who wep then required to prove the negative beyond a reasonable
doubt. . . .So far as appears, there was no type of "defense" which the defendant bad the ultimate burden of proving. . ..
Id. at 62 (Commentary by A. Hechtman).
36. 123 N.Y. 558, 25 N.E. 988 (1890).
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Appeals stated:37
[T]he rule that in criminal cases the defendant is entitled to
the benefit of a reasonable doubt applies not only to the case as
made by the prosecution, but to any defense interposed.
Thus, while the traditional New York rule comported with the
due process standards established in Mullaney, the application of
section 25.00 (2) may not. Examination of the reasoning in some
of the New York cases interpreting section 25.00 indicates as
much.
In People v. Laietta,5 the New York Court of Appeals held
that the burden of an affirmative entrapment defense was consti-

tutional. The court relied heavily on the fact that the United
States Supreme Court had not articulated its views regarding the
burden of persuasion in affirmative defenses.39 Now that the Supreme Court has addressed the issue in Mullaney, each affirma-

tive defense is subject to reexamination in light of the principles
of that decision. The remainder of this note will examine affirmative defenses under three subheadings: affirmative defenses affecting degree of culpability, avoidance defenses, and insanity.
Affirmative Defenses Affecting Degree of Culpability
The Court in Mullaney dealt with one affirmative defense
affecting degree of culpability. Section 125.25 of the New York
Penal Law contains the major New York affirmative defense in

this category. The section includes a provision similar to that
struck down in Mullaney. The New York murder statute requires
that defendants prove they "acted under the influence of extreme
emotional disturbance"4 in order to reduce the grade of the offense to manslaughter. The New York statute, as did the statute
37. Id. at 564, 25 N.E. at 989; accord, People v. Terra, 303 N.Y. 332, 102 N.E.2d 576
(1951), appeal dismissed, 342 U.S. 938 (1952); People v. Sandgren, 302 N.Y. 331, 98
N.E.2d 460 (1951); People v. Egnor, 175 N.Y. 419, 67 N.E. 906 (1903).
38. 30 N.Y.2d 68, 281 N.E.2d 157,330 N.Y.S.2d 351, cert. denied, 407 U.S. 923 (1972).
39. Id. at 74, 281 N.E.2d at 161, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 356.
40. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 1975) provides:
A person is guilty of murder in the second degree when:
1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death
of such person or of a third person, except that in any prosecution under this
subdivision, it is an affirmative defense that:
(a) The defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional
disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse,
the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint
of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the
defendant believed them to be.
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under attack in Mullaney, places on the defendant the burden of
proving a fact critical in determining the degree of criminal culpability. Malice aforethought is, therefore, not an essential element of murder. Under Mullaney, this portion of New York's
homicide statute is clearly unconstitutional.4
A variety of other affirmative defenses affecting the degree
of culpability are found in New York's Penal Law. The first degree robbery statute42 is an example of a statute allocating proof
of an element of the act involved. Under subdivision four of this
statute, it is an affirmative defense if the defendant can prove
that the firearm he appeared to display was not capable of inflicting serious bodily injury.43
Subdivision four, added in 1969, alleviated the harshness on
the prosecution of the then existing statute. Subdivision two of
the original statute, enacted in 1967, provides that a person is
guilty of robbery in the first degree when armed with a deadly
weapon in the course of the crime or of immediate flight therefrom. "Deadly weapon" is defined as a "loaded weapon from
which a shot, readily capable of producing death or other serious
physical injury, may be discharged.

. ...
"4
Prosecutions under

this subdivision in cases where the defendant did not discharge
the firearm and where it was not later recovered were predictably
fruitless. Under such circumstances the victim could not testify
that the gun was loaded. Subdivision four was a logical legislative
response.
41. Indeed, shortly after the decision in Mullaney, two New York lower courts relied
directly on the Supreme Court decision, deleted the word "affirmative" from section
125.25, and thus shifted the burden to the prosecution to disprove that element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Woods, 174 N.Y.L.J. 68, Oct. 6, 1975, at
10, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. Queens County); People v. Balogun, 372 N.Y.S.2d 384 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1975).
42. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 160.15 (McKinney 1975).
43. Id. The section provides:
A person is guilty of robbery in the first degree when he forcibly steals
property and when, in the course of the commission of the crime or of immediate
flight therefrom, he or another participant in the crime:
1. Causes serious physical injury to any person who is not a participant
in the crime; or
2. Is armed with a deadly weapon; or
3. Uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous instrument; or
4. Displays what appears to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine
gun or other firearm; except that in any prosecution under this subdivision, it
is an affirmative defense that such. . . firearm was not a loaded weapon from
which a shot, readily capable of producing death or other physical injury, could
be discharged.
44. Id. § 10.00(12).
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Although a lower New York court has upheld the affirmative
defense against a due process challenge,45 section 160.15 (4) suffers from the same constitutional infirmity which the Supreme
Court decried in Mullaney. The courts will have to convert it to
a plain defense as defined in section 25.00(1), thereby negating
the usefulness of the subdivision by requiring that the People
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the firearm was loaded.
The 1969 provision would then become the equivalent of subdivision two. The burden is now on the state legislature to reform the
statute to comport with both the Court's ruling in Mullaney and
the equitable allocation of proof.
Mullaney is also clearly applicable to the type of affirmative
defense which effectuates a state's policy of varying by statute the
degree of punishment available within a crime category. Such
statutory schemes are now plainly unconstitutional. New York is
by no means the only jurisdiction whose laws will be significantly
affected. Other states have by statute or judicial pronouncement
provided for similar burdens. These jurisdictions include North
Carolina,46 Connecticut," West Virginia,48 and Washington.49
Hawaii, on the other hand, anticipated the Supreme Court's ruling. In a 1971 case,5" its supreme court refused to uphold a statute
which required the defendant to disprove the existence of malice
aforethought once the state proved that he had done the act.
Avoidance Defenses
Another group of affirmative defenses are those which may
be labeled "confession and avoidance." Defenses of this type are
raised when the accused "in effect admits his guilt, but pleads
nonenforceability on other grounds."5 These are also statutory
defenses which should be scrutinized in light of the Supreme
Court's decision.
45. People v. Player, 80 Misc. 2d 177, 362 N.Y.S.2d 773 (County Ct. Suffolk County
1974). In upholding the constitutionality of this affirmative defense, the court rejected the
defendant's contention that the People are by its operation relieved from proving every
essential element of the crime. The court held that the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt "of the entire case" remained with the prosecution. Id. at 180-81, 362 N.Y.S.2d
at 778.
46. State v. Winford, 279 N.C. 58, 181 S.E.2d 423 (1971).
47. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-54a (West Supp. 1975).
48. State v. Stevenson, 147 W. Va. 211, 127 S.E.2d 638 (1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S.
938 (1963).
49. People v. Sill, 47 Wash. 2d 647, 289 P.2d 720 (1955).
50. State v. Cuevas, 53 Hawaii 110, 488 P.2d 322 (1971).
51. United States ex rel. Crosby v. Delaware, 346 F. Supp. 213, 216 (D.Del. 1972).
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Entrapment 2 is one affirmative defense in the nature of
avoidance. The burden of persuasion on entrapment has been the
subject of considerable debate. New York, for example, considers
entrapment to be an affirmative defense.13 Under section 25.00 of
the New York Penal Law the burden falls on the defendant to
establish it by a preponderance of the evidence. The New York
Court of Appeals has upheld this burden. 4 Federal case law
reaches the opposite conclusion; "[tjhe issue having appeared,
it becomes the prosecution's burden to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was not entrapped into the commission of the offense." 55 The rationale often used to justify placing
the burden of persuasion for entrapment on the defendant does
not appear endangered in New York, however. None of the evils
which the Supreme Court sought to eradicate in Mullaney exist
under the entrapment defense as employed by the New York
courts. Analysis of a jurisdiction's test for entrapment is required
before a conclusion can be reached regarding the impact of the
Mullaney decision upon it.
Most entrapment statutes are based on one of two theories
enunciated in various Supreme Court opinions. The first, gaining
majority approval in three major cases,5" focuses on the defendant's intent, predisposition, or propensity to commit the crime.
It attempts to draw a line "between the trap for the unwary
innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal. 5' 7 The fact that
government agents encourage the commission of the crime does
52. New York provides a useful definition:
In any prosecution for an offense, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant
engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was induced or encouraged to do
so by a public servant, or by a person acting in cooperation with a public
servant, seeking to obtain evidence against him for purpose of criminal prosecution, and when the methods used to obtain such evidence were such as to create
a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by a person not otherwise
disposed to commit it.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.05 (McKinney 1975).
53. Id.
54. People v. Laietta, 30 N.Y.2d 68, 281 N.E.2d 157, 330 N.Y.S.2d 351, cert. denied,
407 U.S. 923 (1972). The Bronx County Supreme Court confronted a challenge to New
York's entrapment statute based on Mullaney. The court refused to analogize the two
situations. People v. Long, 372 N.Y.S.2d 389 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1975).
55. Notaro v. United States, 363 F.2d 169, 175 (9th Cir. 1966); accord, United States
v. Ambrose, 483 F.2d 742 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Groessel, 440 F.2d 602 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 933 (1971); United States v. Rodrigues, 433 F.2d 760 (1st Cir.
1970).
56. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1972); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S.
369 (1958); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
57. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958).
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not necessarily void the prosecution under this test. It is premised
on a subjective theory, protecting only those who are "otherwise
innocent,"'" or who would not have committed the crime in the
absence of the government's conduct.
The second major theory disregards the predisposition and
tguilt or innocence of the defendant and focuses instead on the
conduct of the government agents involved. Essentially, the government is estopped from prosecuting when its agents have instigated the crime because their conduct is considered unconscionable. This approach has been adopted by several federal circuits "
and has received notable attention in concurring and dissenting
opinions in the three Supreme Court cases mentioned above.'"
Justice Frankfurter, an originator of the objective approach, summarized the rationale behind it:61
No matter what the defendant's past record and present inclinations to criminality, or the depths to which he has sunk in the
estimation of society, certain police conduct to ensnare him into
further crime is not to be tolerated by an advanced society.
This approach may be given a constitutional basis in that a proper analogy can be drawn to the fourth amendment exclusionary
rule. The Supreme Court has recently reemphasized that the central purpose of the exclusionary rule is deterrence of unconscionable official conduct. 2 The objective approach to entrapment, unlike the subjective one, places primary emphasis on the same
rationale.
While both approaches to entrapment seek to discourage police misconduct, there are important differences of special significance in allocating the burden of persuasion. Many commentators have suggested that New York adopted the subjective
approach when it enacted its entrapment statute in 1967.63 It was
58. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932).
59. See, e.g., United States v. McGrath, 468 F.2d 1027, 1030-31 (7th Cir. 1972);
Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783, 786-87 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Bueno,
447 F.2d 903, 906 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Chisum, 312 F. Supp. 1307, 1310-12

(C.D. Cal. 1970).
60. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 437-39 (1972) (Douglas & Brennan, JJ.,
dissenting); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 382-85 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 454-59 (1932) (Roberts, Brandeis, &
Stone, JJ , concurring).

61. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 382-83 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

62. United States v. Peltier, 95 S.Ct. 2313, 2317-18 (1975); Michigan v.Tucker, 417

U.S. 433, 446 (1974); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974).
63. See, e.g., Levine, The New York Penal Law: A Prosecutor'sEvaluation, 18
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not until People v. Laietta,6 4 however, that an inconsistency between that approach and placing the burden of persuasion on the
defendant became manifest.
The subjective test is directed to the innocence of the defendant. While predisposition could be interpreted as bearing only
on a defendant's propensity to commit prior similar crimes, the
Supreme Court has not clearly distinguished between prior disposition and present intent. The Court's majorities have spoken
only in terms of those "otherwise innocent." Adoption of this
approach as an affirmative defense forces the defendant to disprove a necessary element of the crime-his unlawful intent. It
clearly violates Mullaney's mandate.
If New York had, however, at one time adopted the subjective test of entrapment, it has now clearly tempered its view.
Laietta specifically held that entrapment does not negate an essential element of guilt. A lower New York court 5 has already
reexamined Laietta in light of Mullaney. Quoting Justice Frankfurter's views approvingly, the court stated:6
The presence or absence of entrapment, however, in no way
affects the prosecution's duty to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt every element of the crime charged, for "conduct is not
less criminal because the result of temptation." [Citation omitted.]
Indeed, the factfinder does not even reach the issue of entrapment
until the prosecution has met its traditional burden of proving
every essential element beyond a reasonable doubt."
If New York does not consider its entrapment statute to involve an essential element of guilt, it can no longer be said to
adhere to the subjective theory. New York has not, however, fully
adopted the objective test. That test disregards predisposition,
while New York's entrapment statute clearly does not. New York
has apparently adopted a middle position. It does not focus entirely on police conduct; the defendant must still prove the absence of predisposition. This must now be read as a requirement
L. REV. 269, 277-78 (1968); Comment, Affirmative Defenses Under New York's
New Penal Law, 19 SYR. L. REV. 44, 49 (1967).
64. 30 N.Y.2d 68, 281 N.E.2d 157, 330 N.Y.S.2d 351, cert. denied, 407 U.S. 923 (1972).
65. People v. Long, 372 N.Y.S.2d 389 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1975).
66. Id. at 393.
67. Id. This is in contrast to the subjective theory: "[Tihe issue of whether a defendant has been entrapped is for the jury as part of its function of determining the guilt or
innocence of the accused." Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 377 (1958).
BUFFALO
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of proof bearing on the defendant's proclivity to commit similar
crimes. The confusing blend of present intent and prior propensity has been effectively eliminated from the New York entrapment cases. Thus, the defendant no longer has to negate his present intent, though he is still required to prove absence of propensity by a preponderance of the evidence. The judicial gloss should
save New York's affirmative entrapment defense from a successful constitutional attack. It is not, however, wholly adequate.
Only when New York has fully adopted the objective theory will
there be a comfortable relationship between the affirmative defense and the applied test.
Duress" and renunciation 9 are two other affirmative
defenses in the avoidance defense category. In New York, for
example, both are listed within the same article as entrapment.
Mullaney, however, requires a look beyond formal labels to the
substantive effect upon the defendant. Such an inquiry reveals a
different result in terms of the burden of persuasion when one
examines duress or renunciation as opposed to entrapment. Duress excuses the defendant because "[i]f a person commits an
act under compulsion, responsibility for the act cannot be ascribed to him since, in effect, it was not his own desire, or motivation, or will, which led to the act."7 This defense insures that one
who has not acted of his own free will, will not be held criminally
culpable. Clearly this affirmative defense involves the element of
intent. The New York Court of Appeals, in a case approving the
prosecution's rebuttal of the defense through the introduction of
prior crimes evidence, recognized that a defendant who claims
duress asserts an "absence of the criminal intent ordinarily inferable from the admitted acts of commission."' 7' Placing the burden
68. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.00(l) (McKinney 1975) provides:
In any prosecution for an offense, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant
engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was coerced to do so by the use
or the threatened imminent use of unlawful physical force upon him or a third
person, which force or threatened force a person of reasonable firmness in his
situation would have been unable to resist.
69. Id. § 40.10(1):
In any prosecution for an offense, other than an attempt to commit a crime, in
which the defendant's guilt depends upon his criminal liability for the conduct
of another person . . . it is an affirmative defense that, under circumstances
manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal purpose, the
defendant withdrew from participation in such offense prior to the commission
thereof and made a substantial effort to prevent the commission thereof.
70. Newman & Weitzer, Duress, Free Will and the Criminal Law, 30 S. CAL. L. REv.
313 (1957).
71. People v. Calvano, 30 N.Y.2d 199, 205, 282 N.E.2d 322, 325, 331 N.Y.S.2d 430,
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of persuasion of duress on the defendant forces him to disprove
the element of intent. This burden is unacceptable in view of
Winship and Mullaney.
Renunciation is subject to a similar analysis. A successful
defense of renunciation requires that the jury find, in part, that
the accused had wholly and effectively detached himself from the
criminal enterprise prior to its commission." This showing of a
voluntary abandonment of criminal purpose is intimately connected with the defendant's mental state. Indeed, apparently the
only New York court to construe this portion of the statutory
provision has held that renunciation "involves determination of
a person's motivation and intent which requires the collective
objectivity of a jury, resulting in the composite judgment of a
'73
reasonable man as to what those motives were.
No jury can effectively separate the affirmative defenses of
duress or renunciation from the issue of culpability. The substantive effect upon the defendant clearly outweighs the argument
that proof is peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused.
While Mullaney v. Wilbur is not vital to a ruling in this regard,
it should, nonetheless, provide an impetus for a reevaluation of
the standards for the defenses.
Insanity
New York, by classifying "mental disease or defect" as a
plain defense, 74 follows the federal procedure7l which places the
burden of persuasion on the prosecution to disprove an accused's
alleged insanity beyond a reasonable doubt. This approach is
435 (1972). The case analogized the defense of duress to that of entrapment to permit the
introduction of evidence of prior crimes relating to disposition. That the court indicated
that entrapment involves some degree of intent is inconsistent with entrapment not negating any essential element of a crime. See notes 52-67 supra and accompanying text. On
the other hand, no court has ruled that duress does not involve an essential element of
the crime.
72. NNT. PENAL LAW § 40.10(1) (McKinney 1975).
73. People v. Nassar, 59 Misc. 2d 1034, 1039, 301 N.Y.S.2d 671, 677 (County Ct.
Oneida County 1969).
74. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 30.05 (McKinney 1975). The case law on this proposition is
extensive. See, e.g., People v. Kelly, 303 N.Y. 512, 517, 99 N.E.2d 552, 554 (1951) ("The
question of defendant's sanity . . . depended . . . upon proof by the People beyond a
reasonable doubt"); People v. Slaughter, 34 App. Div. 2d 50, 52, 311 N.Y.S.2d 87, 90 (4th
Dep't 1970) ("When . . .the defense of insanity is raised the People must establish on
the whole case beyond a reasonable doubt. .. ").
75. See Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895); United States v. Bass, 490 F.2d
846 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. McGirr, 434 F.2d 844 (4th Cir. 1970).
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deeply rooted in the common law. Wigmore, for example, observed:7 6
The accused's sanity is, by the orthodox view, a part of the case
of the prosecution; and the burden of proving it, in the sense of
the risk of non-persuasion, is on the prosecution; the measure
of persuasion required being, as in other elements of a crime,
persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt ....
This approach assumes that mental capacity is an essential element of the crime charged. 77 The burden of proof of sanity should,
therefore, be the same as that Imposed for all other material
elements of the crime: proof by the state beyond a reasonable
doubt. The touchstones of this theory are that a culpable mens
rea presupposes sanity 8 and that legal insanity is inconsistent
with a criminal intent. Mental capacity relates to an accused's
ability to form the unlawful intent required for many convictions.
Very simply, the supporters of this approach argue that one cannot have the intent to commit-a ,rime if one does not have the
capacity to formulate such an in-tent.
Many jurisdictions adopt a different rule.7" They hold that
insanity is separable from the issue of guilt or innocence. Thus,
they argue that it is not improper to require a defendant to prove
insanity. These decisions, though reflecting the minority approach, are not in conflict with decisions of the Supreme Court.
In Leland v. Oregon,8" the Court held that there was no infirmity
in a state requirement which placed the burden of persuasion of
insanity on the defendant. The Court reasoned that the prosecution was still required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every
element of the crime charged. Justice Rehnquist's concurrence in
Mullaney succinctly summarized this approach: 8
[Tihe issue of insanity as a defense to a criminal charge [in
Leland] was considered by the jury only after it had found that
all elements of the offense, including the mens rea, if any, re76.

9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2501, at 359-60 (3d ed. 1940) (emphasis in original).

77. See People ex rel. Juhan v. District Court, 165 Colo. 253, 439 P.2d 741, 747 (1968);
People v. Silver, 33 N.Y.2d 475, 478-79, 310 N.E.2d 520, 522, 354 N.Y.S.2d 915, 918 (1974);
Commonwealth v. Vogel, 440 Pa. 1, 268 A.2d 89, 90-91 (1970).
78. See Note, Criminal Law-Reflection: Insanity, Bifurcation, Burden of Proof, 50
N.C.L. REV. 917, 921 (1972).
79. See, e.g., Henderson v. Commonwealth, 507 S.W.2d 454 (Ky. 1974); State v.
DiPaglia, 64 N.J. 288, 315 A.2d 385 (1975).
80. 343 U.S. 790 (1951).
81. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 705-06 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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quired by state law, had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt
S. .. [T]he existence or nonexistence of legal insanity bears
no necessary relationship to the existence or nonexistence of the
required mental elements of the crime.
Implicit in this argument is the notion that legal insanity does not
relate to the ability to formulate intent, but looks instead to
whether the defendant knew the difference between right and
wrong, or to whether the action was the product of mental disease
or defect (depending upon the jurisdiction's test). Thus, a person
may intend to commit an act which is the product of mental
disease or defect, or intend to commit an act but be incapable of
knowing right from wrong. The Supreme Court's recent ruling in
Mullaney should prompt the Court to reconcile the conflict by
reexamining Leland in light of Winship-type cases.
It is clear that Mullaney places in question the constitutionality of many affirmative defenses. It is just as clear, however,
that Mullaney does not, on its face, apply to affirmative defenses
generally. Therefore, the case cannot be construed to directly
render any of the preceding affirmative defenses unconstitutional, with the exception of those in the murder-manslaughter
statutes.
The above analysis of a variety of affirmative defenses was
divided under three subheadings. Mullaney indicates that the
category of the defense should no longer be deemed controlling.
Courts should now look beyond mere labels to the substantive
effect of placing the burden of persuasion on the defendant.
Since Mullaney's holding was.limited, the burden is now on
state courts to reexamine their affirmative defenses, one-by-one,
in light of Mullaney. Only as state courts review their own statutes and clarify the "operation and effect"82 of each, will it be
possible to fully realize the impact of Mullaney v. Wilbur.
Alan E. Wolin
82. Id. at 699, quoting St. Louis S.W.R. Co. v. Arkansas, 235 U.S. 350, 362 (1914).
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